From Dale’s Bookshelf ⚓📚
Book Review – Craig L. Symonds – The Battle of Midway Oxford University Press, 452 Pages, 2011

Mr. Symonds has written a book covering not just the Midway battle but, by providing detailed accounts of the Pacific War beginning with the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, a full background of events that led to the Midway battle. He provides candid descriptions of the senior officers of both American and Japanese navies as well as junior officers who played conspicuous roles in the war. Particularly noteworthy is his description of Admiral Chester Nimitz as “beneath a placid and stoic demeanor, Nimitz concealed both a warrior’s instinct and a willingness to take bold risks.”[1] These qualities showed in stark relief when it came time to meet the Japanese carrier fleet at Midway.

Mr. Symonds shows a keen understanding of the geopolitical pressures on the Allies as the United States was suddenly involved in the war as a fighting participant. Even though the Japanese were rampaging through the western Pacific, Nazi Germany was recognized as the more potent threat. Not only were their capabilities greater than those of Japan, but Mr. Symonds makes clear the threat to Britain from both invasion and submarine blockade had to be thwarted as the first priority of the Allied coalition. Mr. Symonds also articulates the mistaken Japanese belief that they could make the war so expensive for the United States in financial cost and manpower casualties that negotiations would result in the retention of their western Pacific empire. Events showed the folly of that belief.

Despite the attention to detail elsewhere in the book, Mr. Symonds overlooked a crucial detail in the after-action report of Rear Admiral Fletcher on the Battle of Midway. Fletcher states his intention to be 200 miles north of Midway in the very early morning of June 4 in order to execute the concentration of force which Nimitz had planned.[2] Fletcher decided to make an unplanned scouting mission that took him out of operating range when the PBY contact report was received that was to trigger the US carrier attack in coordination with the planes from Midway. The concentration of force failed, and the battle was a scramble after that. Combinations of American astuteness and bravery combined with Japanese mistakes tipped the battle to the Americans, albeit with heavy casualties. Earlier historians who had the opportunity to interview participants during and after the war, including Samuel Eliot Morison, Richard Bates, and E B Potter, all stated in their writings that the carriers were to be 200 miles directly north of Midway when the PBY sighting report was received. Once the great Midway victory was realized, no one, particularly Adm. Nimitz, was going to complain about not following the Nimitz battle plan, but he deserves great praise for the plan he had put in place.

Less forgivable is a deliberate editing of a statement in the memoirs of Ensign George Gay, the only surviving pilot of the Hornet torpedo squadron. This editing apparently is an effort to support a highly controversial account of the course taken by the Hornet air group during the Midway battle. The controversial account asserts that the Hornet after-action report signed by Captain and Admiral-select Marc Mitscher, the commanding officer, was untrue. The assertion is that the Hornet air group actually flew on course 265, or almost directly west. In this scenario the Hornet planes would have passed to the north of the Japanese force, and the torpedo squadron, which deviated from the air group course, would have taken a course to the south to intercept the Japanese. Mr. Symonds quotes an exchange from Ens. Gay:

“(Squadron commander Waldron) pulled aside his squadron navigator (Ens. Gay) and told him he thought the assigned course was wrong. If necessary, he told Gay, he would fly his own course to the target. ‘Don’t think I’m lost,’ Waldron said, ‘just track me so that if anything happens to me the boys can count on you to bring them back.”[3]

As recounted in Gay’s memoir Sole Survivor (design and production by Midway Publishers, 316 pages, 1979, 1986), just before departing, Hornet squadron commander Waldron met him. As quoted in Sole Survivor, Waldron said, 

“The Group Commander is going to take the whole bunch down there. (to the south) I’m going more to the north, and maybe by the time they come north and find them, we can catch up and all go in together. Don’t think I’m lost. Just track me so if anything happens to me, the boys can count on you to bring them back.”[4] (Boldface added)

Symonds’s account of this exchange is edited in an effort to support the assertion that the Hornet air group flew westward on course 265 because in that scenario the torpedo squadron would have had to deviate to the south of the track of the Hornet air group. By purposely editing the Gay account of the exchange with Waldron he attempts to falsely alter the historical record of the Midway battle.

Not content with leaving out this information to further his theory, Mr. Symonds states in an endnote, Chapter 12, Note 19, that Gay may have changed his account in order to comply with the action report. This is insulting to Gay, whose reminiscences are his candid account of his experiences without reference to any official report.

In fact, it was impossible for Gay to have ever seen the report. Gay as a junior officer would not have been a party to the preparation of the report, as he was hospitalized at Pearl Harbor with wounds sustained at Midway during the time the report was prepared. The Hornet report, dated June 13, 1942, was prepared prior to Hornet’s arrival at Pearl Harbor on June 13, delivered to Adm. Fletcher, then to Adm Spruance aboard Enterprise on June 14, who forwarded it to Adm. Nimitz for inclusion in the official Nimitz report dated June 15.

The report itself was classified “Secret” up to the time that Gay wrote his memoir, and he would have been precluded from having access to the document in the unlikely event that he wished to do so. To say that Gay falsified his memoir to comply with the Action report is not only absurd but impossible.

In Appendix F, Mr. Symonds quotes from Adm. Spruance’s action report, which would have included the reports from the carrier commanding officers of Enterprise and Hornet: “Where discrepancies exist between Enterprise and Hornet reports, the Enterprise report should be taken as more accurate.” Mr. Symonds states “it comes close to asserting that Mitscher’s report was not to be trusted.” There is nothing in the Spruance statement to identify anything in either the Enterprise or Hornet reports to indicate any discrepancy between the two reports, and for the assumption that the Hornet group flight path was the reason for Spruance’s statement is rank speculation. This is particularly true since the Hornet report was accepted as factual, as Mr. Symonds states, for nearly fifty years.

The Enterprise after-action report, dated 8 June, could have been delivered to Adm. Spruance in flag quarters aboard Enterprise, and Spruance would have had five days to review it while the ships were returning to Pearl Harbor. By contrast, the Hornet report could not be delivered until the ships were back in Pearl Harbor on 13 June. The report would have been circulated first to Adm Fletcher on Yorktown before being passed to Adm. Spruance, who would have had very limited time to review it before passing it to Adm. Nimitz on 14 June for the Nimitz report dated 15 June.

Spruance’s statement more probably refers to the time he had to review the two reports. He had access to the Enterprise report from 8 June to 13 June as the ships were returning to Pearl Harbor. Once in Pearl Harbor one can safely assume there were many things that required his attention, including a review of the Hornet report for the first time. Nimitz demanded the reports very promptly, and the Hornet report had to pass from Hornet through Fletcher, then Spruance, and finally to Nimitz whose report included all the subordinate reports as enclosures. One can understand that the vast difference in times available for review probably motivated Spruance to make the statement he did only for lack of enough time to review the Hornet report to his satisfaction.

[1] P..14

[2] Report of ComCruPac (Adm Fletcher) to CincPac, 14 June, 1942

[3] PP 259-260

[4] Sole Survivor, p. 113.

Diplomats & Admirals • Aubrey Publishing Co. LLC. • December 1, 2022 🛒🔗 Purchase Links: Amazon | Barnes & Noble | Kindle