DIPLOMATS & ADMIRALS Excerpt: Ambassador Grew
Diplomats & Admirals Excerpt: U.S. Ambassador Grew

On September 27, (1941) Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda met with U.S. Ambassador Grew. He knew of Grew’s close relationship with President Roosevelt and asked the ambassador to make a personal request for a summit meeting between Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoe. There was the opportunity in such a communication from Grew to imply that Konoe was constricted by holdover staff from the earlier Foreign Minister Matsuoka period and would be able to make much more explicit proposals when meeting directly with Roosevelt. Unstated but implicit was the opportunity for the two leaders to form an understanding outside the approval process imposed by the Japanese armed forces. Once an agreement was reached the armed forces would be pressured to concede. Grew agreed, and on September 29 sent a lengthy and very carefully considered communication of more than four pages. Within the communication, Grew stated:

Should the United States expect or await clear cut commitments the conversations will drag on indefinitely until the Konoe government will come to the conclusion that the United States government is only playing for time. The logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoe government… Prime Minister Konoe is in a position in direct negotiations with President Roosevelt to offer him assurances which will not fail to satisfy the United States. 

In normal diplomatic protocol, a communication from an ambassador must go through the secretary of state. It is unfortunate that in this single case Grew did not make an exception and, building on his personal relationship with Roosevelt going back to their student days at Harvard, write directly to him in a message “for your eyes only.” Instead, Ambassador Grew followed normal protocol. His comprehensive communication delivered to Secretary of State Hull had no effect, may not have been understood, and was essentially discarded. In a meeting with Japanese Ambassador Nomura three days later on October 2, Hull made no mention of the Grew communication and just reminded Nomura of stale outstanding issues. This was a major lost opportunity to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough, and there would not be another one.

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Diplomats & Admirals • Aubrey Publishing Co. LLC. • December 1, 2022 🛒🔗 Purchase Links: Amazon | Barnes & Noble | Kindle


 

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About the Author

Dale Jenkins has had a lifelong interest in the Navy and international affairs. He is a former US Navy officer who served on a destroyer in the Pacific, and for a time was home-ported in Yokosuka, Japan. Pacific Fleet commitments took him to the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. While on active duty he was awarded the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal. Dale is also Senior Advisor to Americans for a Stronger Navy.

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