On September 27, (1941) Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda met with U.S. Ambassador Grew. He knew of Grew’s close relationship with President Roosevelt and asked the ambassador to make a personal request for a summit meeting between Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoe. There was the opportunity in such a communication from Grew to imply that Konoe was constricted by holdover staff from the earlier Foreign Minister Matsuoka period and would be able to make much more explicit proposals when meeting directly with Roosevelt. Unstated but implicit was the opportunity for the two leaders to form an understanding outside the approval process imposed by the Japanese armed forces. Once an agreement was reached the armed forces would be pressured to concede. Grew agreed, and on September 29 sent a lengthy and very carefully considered communication of more than four pages. Within the communication, Grew stated:
Should the United States expect or await clear cut commitments the conversations will drag on indefinitely until the Konoe government will come to the conclusion that the United States government is only playing for time. The logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoe government… Prime Minister Konoe is in a position in direct negotiations with President Roosevelt to offer him assurances which will not fail to satisfy the United States.
In normal diplomatic protocol, a communication from an ambassador must go through the secretary of state. It is unfortunate that in this single case Grew did not make an exception and, building on his personal relationship with Roosevelt going back to their student days at Harvard, write directly to him in a message “for your eyes only.” Instead, Ambassador Grew followed normal protocol. His comprehensive communication delivered to Secretary of State Hull had no effect, may not have been understood, and was essentially discarded. In a meeting with Japanese Ambassador Nomura three days later on October 2, Hull made no mention of the Grew communication and just reminded Nomura of stale outstanding issues. This was a major lost opportunity to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough, and there would not be another one.
⚓🔗 Click here for more excerpts from DIPLOMATS & ADMIRALS 🌊
Diplomats & Admirals • Aubrey Publishing Co. LLC. • December 1, 2022 🛒🔗 Purchase Links: Amazon | Barnes & Noble | Kindle
DaleInteresting reading. The story illustrates the importance and necessity of direct and in-pers
When my father was living in Los Angeles about a year or so before they attacked the U.S. , he told me that the average citizens had talked about Japan and it’s warlike ambitions before it began .
He described it as almost like it was common knowledge at the time ‘
With all of our sectret radio transmissions , spies and the entire U.S. War collage , that Roosevelt and his administration didn’t have a clue about it ??
I cannot comprehend that !