Decryption experts at Pearl Harbor broke the Japanese code that detailed the Japanese advance toward Midway a week ahead of the June 4, 1942 attack. The Japanese would launch half their planes at 0430 from 220 miles northwest of Midway against PacFlt shore defenses on the Midway islands. Adm Nimitz ordered scouting with PBYs launched also at 0430 on June 4 that he expected would encounter the Japanese carrier fleet at about 0600.

Nimitz decided that the most effective counterattack was a concentration of force of planes from Midway and the three carriers — Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown — to arrive simultaneously over the Japanese carrier fleet when half the Japanese planes were away attacking the shore defenses on Midway. Attack planes from Midway would launch immediately upon receiving the PBY report about 0600, and after flying 140 miles they would be over the Japanese carrier fleet about 0715. The destruction of flight decks, even without sinking the carriers, would mean that the Japanese planes returning from Midway, low on fuel, would be unable to land.

Douglas SBD Dauntless dropping a bomb, circa 1942

The Nimitz counterattack called for the three carriers to approach under cover of darkness and be 200 miles directly north of Midway Island at 0600. This position also was 140 miles from the anticipated interception point of the Japanese carriers by the Midway planes. Launched at 0600, the same time as the planes launched from Midway, they would meet the Midway planes in a concentration of force over the Japanese carriers at 0715. Complete execution of this plan could have resulted in a PacFlt victory by 0745–0815. The carrier’s position of 200 miles directly north of Midway at 0600 is stated in the CINCPac after-action report of June 15, 1942 and is substantiated in the books of contemporary historians Samuel Eliot Morison, Richard Bate, and E.B. Potter, all of whom had the opportunity to interview battle participants during and after the war.

The plan failed when the PacFlt carriers executed unplanned scouting prior to 0600 and were 195–205 miles away from the interception point at 0600, and beyond the 175-mile operating range of the carrier planes. The Midway planes went in alone and made valiant attacks against the Japanese carriers.  Most of the planes were shot down by defending Zeroes without inflicting so much as a scratch on the Japanese carriers. After closing the range, the attack by Enterprise and Yorktown dive bombers decided the battle with the sinking of three Japanese carriers at 1025, followed by a fourth later the same day, albeit with heavy losses of planes, crews, and carrier Yorktown.

Yorktown in drydock at Pearl Harbor on 29 May 1942, shortly before departing for Midway

After the victory no one was going to complain about not following the original plan, least of all Nimitz, and the plan was forgotten until now. But Nimitz deserves even greater credit for the Midway victory when his battle plan to achieve the Midway victory early on June 4 is considered.

Diplomats & Admirals • Aubrey Publishing Co. LLC. • December 1, 2022 🛒🔗 Purchase Links: Amazon | Barnes & Noble | Kindle